Doing Almost Nothing

W.I.P. by J.Y.Ooi


part i

  1. Preface
  2. Kurfürstendamm
  3. Prehistory
  4. Dichotomy of Ku’damm

part ii

  1. Aggregate and Adler
  2. Crisis
  3. Brief

part iii

  1. Precarity
  2. Emancipation
  3. Plans
  4. Trajectory
  5. Outcome(?)

PART IV

  1. References
  2. Credit

Crisis

The Collapse of Adler Group


“Adler’s 2020 sale of Kurfürstendamm 231 to Aggregate Holdings was a sham transaction. The property was sold at a €100 million discount to fair value, effectively transferring wealth from Adler’s shareholders to Caner’s private company.”

— Viceroy Research


Figure above is the official visualisation used as Project FURST marketing material. Taken from PROJECT FURST.

In October 2021, short-seller Viceroy Research published a report accusing Adler Group of systemic fraud. Viceroy alleged Adler had inflated asset values by €2.5 billion through circular transactions with Caner-linked shell companies, including overstating the worth of renovation projects and fabricating rental income. The report also highlighted Adler’s reliance on Aggregate Holdings as both a shareholder and a counterparty, creating a “black box” of undisclosed liabilities.

The fallout was immediate: Adler’s stock plummeted 70%, its bonds crashed to junk status, and regulators (BaFin) launched investigations. By 2022, Adler faced a liquidity crunch, unable to refinance maturing debts. Creditors, including BlackRock and Pimco, demanded asset sales, forcing Adler to offload properties at fire-sale prices. Caner resigned from Adler’s board in 2021 but retained influence via Aggregate’s stake.

Adler’s collapse had dire consequences for Project FURST:

  • Funding Freeze: Aggregate had relied on Adler’s financial ecosystem to secure loans for the project. With Adler’s credit rating obliterated, lenders froze credit lines, leaving Aggregate unable to draw €450 million in pre-approved construction financing.
  • Legal Challenges: Adler’s creditors sued to reverse the Kurfürstendamm 231 sale, alleging it was a “fraudulent transfer” designed to shield assets from creditors. A Frankfurt court temporarily froze Aggregate’s ownership in 2022, halting all construction permits.
  • Design Compromises: With funding uncertain, Chipperfield’s team was pressured to reduce costs. Early plans for hand-carved stone facades and underground cultural spaces were shelved in favor of prefabricated concrete and smaller retail footprints.

By mid-2023, the site remained a fenced-off pit, emblematic of Berlin’s broader crisis of stalled developments—a phenomenon urbanists dubbed “ruins of capital.”

To salvage Project FURST, Aggregate embarked on a high-stakes refinancing campaign:

  • Debt Extensions: In 2023, Aggregate renegotiated €1.4 billion in debt, extending maturities to 2026 and pledging additional collateral, including its Lisbon luxury portfolio.
  • Asset Sales: Aggregate sold non-core assets, including Berlin’s Upper West Mall (€210 million) and stakes in Portuguese hotels, raising €500 million earmarked for Kudamm 231.
  • Alternative Financing: The firm issued convertible bonds tied to Project FURST’s future revenue, marketed to hedge funds speculating on Berlin’s post-pandemic real estate rebound.

The financial turmoil forced architectural compromises:

  • Phased Construction: The project was split into phases: a retail podium (2025) and office tower (2027), delaying public spaces indefinitely.
  • Material Substitutions: Chipperfield’s original stone cladding was replaced with textured concrete panels, citing cost cuts. Critics argued this undermined the design’s contextual sensitivity, reducing it to a “poor cousin” of Chipperfield’s earlier Museum Island projects.
  • Community Backlash: Housing activists protested the project, arguing that luxury developments like FURST exacerbate Berlin’s affordability crisis.